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Abstrat
The distintion between bank and market based eonomies has a long tradition in applied
maroeonomis. The two types dier not only in the level of nanial ativity hanneled
through the stok market and private banking, but also in their institutional frameworks.
We hallenge this traditional distintion between the two types of nanial arhiteture. We
develop an index that aounts for omplementarity between nanial markets and banking
systems that has been hypothesized by Sylla (1998) and Song and Thakor (2010). The
theoretial foundation of our empirial approah is the general equilibrium framework by
Freixas and Rohet (1997). We validate the proposed index and the underlying theory of
omplementary using a random oeient and a Generalized estimating equations (GEE)
models.
Il existe une longue tradition en maroéonomie appliquée sur la distintion entre les
éonomies basées sur les banques et elles sur les marhés. Ces deux types d'éonomies ne
dièrent pas seulement sur leur niveau d'ativité sur le marhé nanier et les banques mais
aussi ave leurs diérenes institutionnelles. Nous remettons en question ette distintion
entre les deux types d'arhiteture nanière. Pour ela, nous utilisons un index qui prend en
ompte la omplémentarité entre les marhés et les banques (hypothèse de Sylla et de Song
(1998) et Thakor (2010)). Le modèle théorique de notre approhe empirique est l'équilibre
général de Freixas et Rohas (1997). Nous validons l'index proposé et la théorie sous jaente
en utilisant les modèles éonométriques appelés "random oeient" et "Generalized esti-
mating equations (GEE)".
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1 Introdution
The distintion between bank and market based eonomies has a long tradition in applied maroe-
onomis. Bank-based nanial systems are prevalent in ontinental Europe (with Switzerland
being a notable exeption), while nanial systems in the Anglo-Saxon ountries are heavily
market-based. The two types of nanial systems dier not only in the level of nanial ativity
hanneled through the stok market and private banking, but also in their institutional and legal
frameworks.
Allen and Gale (1999) stress the advantage of a nanial market over bank based systems
in aggregating and olleting information and in providing inentives for investment. Boot and
Thakor (1997) show using a theoretial model that by oordinating the agents' ations, banks
resolve asset substitution problems, whereas nanial markets improve the real deision of a
rm due to feed bak from market pries. The onlusions of these studies suggest that bank
and market based systems dier in their performane, and it is important to understand these
dierenes. Levine (2002) hallenged this onlusion and argued that the degree of nanial
development is more important than nanial struture, partiularly in explaining eonomi
growth.
The fat that the existing literature is divided on the importane of nanial arhiteture
on providing funds for investment and growth suggests that it might not be the ompetition
but rather the omplementarity between dierent omponents of the nanial arhiteture that
plays a deisive role in improving the overall performane and eieny. In this vein Sylla
(1998) and Song and Thakor (2010) stress the possibility that the two systems are not mutually
exlusive and ompeting entities but that they an omplement eah other and o-evolve. Sylla
was among the rst to desribe a potential omplementarity that may exist between seurities
markets and banks. To him, this interation is responsible of what he alled the "federalist
nanial revolution" in the US. It was a "jump starter" of US eonomi hanges resulting in
industrial and transportation revolution. Taking this theme further, Song and Thakor (2010)
identify several dimensions in the interation between banks and apital markets, ompetition,
omplementarity and o-evolution being the most prominent ones. Song and Thakor's argument
is theoretial.
The aim of this paper is to test Song and Thakor's theory empirially. To this we use
an index of omplementarity between the banking setor and the stok market developed in
2
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Saillard and Url (2011). A fundamental question is: Are the omplementary nane systems more
eient to transfer apital from savers to investors? Can the hannels suggested by Song and
Thakor's be validated empirially? Briey antiipating our results, we nd that omplementarity
as formulated in Song and Thakor's theory and represented by our index and an explain the
degree of the eieny in the nanial system. The higher the degree of omplementarity, the
more eient the nanial system.
In the following setion we provide a short desription of the nanial struture index. Setion
3 emphasizes the omplementarity onept and skethes out a general equilibrium model that
identies eieny in the banking setor and suggests its main determinant. In our empirial
analysis we proxy the ineieny of a banking system using an estimate of Finanial Intermedi-
ation Servies Indiretly Measured (FISIM). We used the fees and ommission reeivable divided
by the stok market traded value as proxy of the market apital eieny degree. The degree
of ineieny based on FISIM and Fees are the dependent variables in the subsequent empirial
analysis. Setion 4 disusses the data and estimation tehniques. Setion 5 presents the results,
whih are followed by the onlusion.
2 A measure for omplementary in nanial markets
Currently in the literature, two indies represents two interations between banks and markets:
one represents the ompetition whereas the other represents the omplementarity. The setion is
divided into two parts, one part giving details about the omputation of an index. Our starting
point would be the omputation of the index representing ompetition suggested by Demirgu-
Kunt and Levine (1999). Seondly, the omputation of the omplementarity index. Both are
omputed in Saillard and Url(2011).
The measure for nanial market struture suggested by Demirgu-Kunt and Levine (1999) is a
ontinuous number inreasing in the extent of market-based nane of domesti rms. The index
ompares the level of nanial ativity hanneled through the stok market to that failitated
by private banks. The index ombines deposits at banks, DB, private redit by banks, PCB,
overhead osts of banks, OCB, the stok market apitalization, SMC, and the stok market total
traded value, SMT, into an index number. The rst two omponents of the index are the ratio
of the stok market apitalization to deposits at banks, Ait, and the ratio of the stok market
total traded value to private redit by banks, Bit:
3
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Ait =
SMCit
DBit
Bit =
SMTit
PCBit
(2.1)
Both omponents are omputed for eah ountry i and year t. Furthermore, Demirgu-Kunt
and Levine (1999) use the ratio of bank overhead osts to total assets of banks, TAB, and multiply
it by the stok market total traded value to GDP ratio to ompute the third omponent, Cit:
Cit =
OCBit
TABit
SMTit
GDPit
(2.2)
Then all three omponents, Ait, Bit, and Cit are mean orreted by subtrating the mean
over all ountries and years, f. in the ase of the stok market apitalization to deposit at banks
ratio we obtain:
ait = (Ait −A..)
where A.. represent the mean of Ait aross ountries and years. Finally, the index of nanial
market struture, IFMSit, is omputed as the average of the three omponents:
IFMSit =
ait + bit + cit
3
A higher value of this index learly indiates a higher degree of market-based nane for
ountry i. In order to obtain a measure of omplementary nanial markets we rearrange the
rst two omponents of the index by Demirgur-Kunt and Levine suh that those omponents
inrease if marked and bank-based harateristis within a ountry are balaned. Speially, we
ompute produts rather than ratios between marked- and bank-based variables and normalize
all variables with respet to GDP to make numbers omparable aross ountries:
A∗it =
DBit
GDPit
SMCit
GDPit
B∗it =
PCBit
GDPit
SMTit
GDPit
(2.3)
The modied ratios ahieve a maximum value if market- and bank based nane are of equal
size, reeting the idea of omplementary rather than ompetitive nanial markets. This hump
shape pattern is illustrated in Figure ICindex for stylized eonomies with either loan or equity
nane. If the ountry is fully market-based, rms will be ompletely naned by equity and
the ountry will show up on the origin of the horizontal axis. Fully bank-based eonomies, on
4
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the other hand, will show up at the right hand orner. The index of omplementarity will on-
sequently have low values at both extrema points and will have its maximum if market- and
bank-based features are balaned. The third indiator, Cit, does not have a similar reinterpre-
tation; we therefore take Cit as in Demirgu-Kunt and Levine. Again we subtrat means aross
ountries and years from the modied omponents, making the index of omplementary nane,
ICit, inreasing in the size of nanial markets within ountry i relative to the sample average:
ICit =
a∗it + b
∗
it + cit
3
The demeaning is indiated in Figure (1) by the dashed horizontal line. Countries above
this mean have highly developed nanial markets, in the sense that deposits, loans, and other
means of nane are large in omparison to GDP. Countries with less developed nanial markets
will show up below the dashed line, as their indiators of nanial intermediation are ompar-
atively small. We use the urrent release of the World Bank dataset to ompute our index of
omplementary nanial markets.
The preeding framework is provided as a starting point to represent the omplementarity in
an empirial study. The next setion is devoted to desribe the dierent interations existing
between markets and banks, the solution of the general equilibrium models and the empirial
models following it.
3 Theoretial bakground and model speiation
In the model of Song and Thakor, the borrower has several hoies onerning its naning
soure: diret apital market, seuritization and a relationship loan from a bank. However,
two fritions limit the borrower to aess a naning. "Certiation", due to the heterogeneity
among the borrowers and "Finaning", whih omes from the dierent evaluation of the surplus
of a projet by those providing naning versus those seeking naning. The dierent solution
oered by banks and nanial markets to these fritions lead Song and Thakor to stress that
nanial arhiteture exhibit three types of interations:
1. Competition: is the key theoretial ndings in the literature. Borrowers would onsider
a naning soure at the expenses of the other. The index of Levine omputed in Saillard
and Url (2011) represented in Figure (2) shows one representation of the nanial arhiteture
5
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Figure 1: Complementarity Index
representing the so alled "bank market" view. This representation onsiders that one market is
large enough in omparison to the other, to desribe a ountry. Typially, US as market-based
system and Germany as bank-based system.
2. Complementarity (what we are interested here): works with two hannels : seuritization
and bank apital onnet banks and nanial markets and, allow to say that both are ating
together to answer the two fritions desribed above, "omplementers". Typially, banks with
their redit analysis ability an better than apital market derease the Certiation frition. For
the Finaning frition, the apital market is apable of lowering borrowing osts by providing a
liquid market.
In the Figure (1), we represent the evolution of an index of omplementarity (vertial axis)
and the share loans of rm nane (horizontal axis). The maximum of the urve is reahed
when the share of external nane is 50 %. At this point, the rms used mixed naning from
banks and nanial markets. We onsider suh nanial systems as exhibit omplementarity.
As illustrated, the Complementarity Index reahed a maximum value at this point. As further
illustration, we represent in the Figure (2), a ranking of the ountries following the Competition
(left side of the graph) and the Complementarity (right side of the graph)
1
. The index of
1
Co evolution is the third interation but we did not onsidered it in this paper, see Song and Thakor (2010)
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Figure 2: Classiation of ountries following the 2 indexes
omplementarity exaerbates a new nanial arhiteture lassiation. Switzerland, United-
Kingdom and Netherlands are heavily omplementary systems. By following the ompetition
theory, they are market based systems for Switzerland and United Kingdom and bank based
systems for Netherlands. In general, most of the market based systems stress omplementarity,
with Finland as notable exeption. Surprisingly, Canada and Spain are not following this rule:
although they are bank based systems, they are shifting "omplementary systems".
3.1 The Theoretial Foundations
The general equilibrium framework by Freixas and Rohet (1997) serves as a theoretial foun-
dation of our empirial models. Notie that this hoie is motivated by the fat that it gives
theoretial indiation onerning interest rates in the general equilibrium, inluding the banking
setor. Furthermore, savers (banks and nanial markets) and investors (rm) are represented
in this theoretial model. For these reasons, we onsider the model appropriate to guide our
empirial models.
The following equation gives the solution of optimization problems for eah agent: onsumer,
rm and bank.
Consumer's Problem.
7
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The representative onsumer's optimization problem is written as follows:
maxu(C1, C2)
Ph C1 +Bh +D
+ = ω1 (3.4)
C2 = πf + πb + (1 + r)Bh + (1 + rD)D
+. (3.5)
Here S represents the alloation of his savings between banks deposits D+ and seurities Bh.
The representative onsumer hooses between a onsumption prole (C1, C2), so as to maximize
his utility funtion u under the two budget onstraints (3.4)-(3.5). The prots of the rm πf and
the prots of the banks πb are distributed to the onsumer at t = 2. Finally, r and rD denote the
interest rates paid by seurities and deposits. Seurities and deposits are onsidered as perfet
substitutes.
For t = 1, 2, the onsumer's utility funtion is given by:
C1 +
1
(1 + r)
C2 = ω1 −Bh −D
+ +
1
(1 + r)
[
πf + πb + (1 + r)Bh + (1 + rD)D
+
]
. (3.6)
We solve it with the method of Lagrange multipliers:
L = u(C1, C2) + λ
[
C1 +
1
(1 + r)
C2 − ω1 +Bh +D
+
−
πf
(1 + r)
−
πb
(1 + r)
−Bh −
(1 + rD)
(1 + r)
D+
]
with the following rst-order onditions:
∂L
∂C1
=
∂u
∂c1
+ λ = 0, (3.7)
∂L
∂C2
=
∂u
∂c2
+
λ
1 + r
= 0, (3.8)
∂L
∂Bh
= λ− λ = 0, (3.9)
∂L
∂D+
= λ−
λ(1 + rd)
1 + r
= 0. (3.10)
The last rst-order ondition (3.10) yields
λ =
λ(1 + rd)
1 + r
= 0, (3.11)
r = rD.
8
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Firm's Problem. The rm maximizes its prot with the following program:
max u(πf )
Ph C1 +Bh +D
+ = ω1 (3.12)
I = Bf + L
−
(3.13)
where f represents the prodution funtion of the representative rm and rL, the interest rate
on bank loans. The rm hooses its investment level I, its level of bank debt L−, and issuane
of seurities Bf .
Here again the Lagrange multipliers are used to solve the rm program:
L = f(I)− (1 + r)Bf − (1 + rL)L
− + λ(I −Bf − L
−)
∂L
∂Bf
= −(1 + r)− λ = 0, (3.14)
∂L
∂L−
= −(1 + rL)− λ = 0, (3.15)
As noted by Freixas and Rohet (1997), (3.14)-(3.15)) has an interior solution
r = rL
Bank's Problem. The objetive of the bank is to maximize its prot:
maxu(πb)
Pb πb = r
+
L − rBb − rDD
−
(3.16)
L+ = Bb +D
−, (3.17)
where L+ and D− represent, respetively, the supply of loans and the demand for deposits.
9
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The rst-order onditions:
L = πb − rLL
+ + rBb + rDD
− + λ(L+ −Bb −D
−)
∂L
∂Bb
= r − λ = 0, (3.18)
∂L
∂D−
= rD − λ = 0, (3.19)
∂L
∂L+
= λ− λ = 0 (3.20)
give the solution of the bank prot maximization:
r = rD = rL (3.21)
Moreover, the equality of interest rates appears as the only possible solution of the general
equilibrium (Freixas and Rohet (1997)).
In this setion, we touhed upon a few entral aspets of omplementarity theory. Further-
more, we identify a denition of eieny by using the general equilibrium inluding the banking
setor. The objetive of the next setion is to show how we integrate these onepts in our em-
pirial models.
4 Data and Estimation
The goal of this paper is to demonstrate if there is a link between eieny and the level of
omplementarity of nanial systems and, generally, to oer an empirial test of the Song and
Thakor theory. The general equilibrium model suggests 3.21 as a theoretial solution. The
disrepany in this equation reets the degree of ineieny in nanial markets.
The disrepany in equality 3.21 an be measured using the Finanial Intermediation Servies
Indiretly Measured (FISIM) data from the National Aounts. Sine these data are not available
for the whole sample period from 1990 to 2010, we propose a proxy measure for FISIM as the
dierene between the Interest Inome and the Interest Expenses. To get a relative measure
that would be readily omparable between ountries, we normalize this dierene by the stok
of loans:
10
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Interest Inome - Interest Expenses
Loan
∗ 100 (4.22)
Another possible measure of the disrepany stated above in the equation 3.21 an be mea-
sured using a ratio of market apital ineieny omputed as follow:
Fees and ommissions reeivable
stok market value traded
(4.23)
The two hannels stressed by Song and Thakor are aounted for in our empirial models
by: 1). Issuane (to represent seuritization), and 2). Own apital and Bonds to represent the
apital market naning.
4.1 Random Coeient Model
Let us now shift to the speiation of the empirial models that we use. Firstly, the random
oeient models.
General speiation of the panel linear data regression problem inspired from Hsiao 2004.
Eah individual has their own oeients and there are spei to eah time period.
yit = β′kixkit + uit (4.24)
= β1itx1it + ...+ βkitxkit + uit (4.25)
In our sample, we have i = 16 and t = 19. In order to respet some struture imposed by
the parameters βkit, we run a test desribed by Hsiao (1986), whether or not the slopes and
interepts simultaneously are homogeneous among dierent individuals at dierent times.
We test the equality of interepts and slopes among ountries f Hsiao, f Stata. The results
are the rejetion of null hypothesis stated we use the random oeients models (see Hsiao
(1986)):
11
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yit =
K∑
k=1
βkixkit + uit (4.26)
=
K∑
k=1
(βk + αki)xkit + uit (4.27)
β = (β1, ..., βK)
′ : ommon-mean oeient vetor and
αi = (α1i, ..., αKi)
′ : individual deviation from the ommon mean, β
As we are interested by the performane of group of ountries and we have no reasons to
believe that random oeients are orrelated with explanatory variables, we are onsidering,
αki as random variables with 0 mean and onstant ovarianes and varianes. In other words,
we are using a random oeient model, with βi = β + αi and treated as random.
4.2 Gamma GEE
The above random oeient models does not aount for the non-negativity of the dependent
variable as dened by the equation 4.22. A glane at the empirial distribution in the left panel
of Figure 3 (diamonds) and the orresponding histogram reveals a notieable positive skew in
the dependent variable. Both observation together suggest modeling the onditional mean of the
dependent variable as a mean of a gamma distributed random variable
2
. A Maximum Likelihood
estimate of a two parameter Gamma density with parameters α = 7.47 and β = 0.46 shows a
suiently lose t (solid line).
In view of the empirial distribution of the dependent variable, we estimate a Generalized
Estimating Equation (GEE) with a Gamma distribution and a anonial link funtion. The GEE
is an extension of the Generalized Linear Model developed in MCullagh and Nelder (1989) to
longitudinal data analysis, with possibly non independent (lustered) error strutures. The GEE
framework has been developed in Liang and Zeger (1986) and Zeger and Liang (1986).
The basi speiation of a Gamma GEE is as follows:
Yit ∼ Γ(α, β) where α, β > 0 µit = EYit
g(µit) =
K∑
k=1
βkixkit g(z) = z
−1
2
This distribution is also founded by Berger (1993).
12
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The sum is a linear preditor, whih is related to the mean of a gamma distributed random
variable Yit via a link funtion g. We hose the anonial link funtion appropriate for the mean
of a Gamma distributed dependent variable (for details, see, MCullagh and Nelder (1989)). The
goodness of t an be judges by a plot of the quantiles of Pearson residuals again quantiles of a
zero-mean normally distributed random variable having the same variane. This plot is provided
in the right panel of Figure 3. We see some departure from normality in the left tail of the
distribution and a remarkably good agreement in the enter of the distribution.
5 Results
We want to test the hypothesis whether the omplementary nane systems are more eient
to transfer apital from savers to investors. For this purpose we run a series of regressions based
on equation 3.10- 3.20 employing the random oeient model estimations and generalizing
estimating equations. As explained in the Setion 3, two hannels are reognize by Song and
Thakor to link banks and markets by limiting the frition to obtain naning. If the theory of
Song and Thakor is demonstrated in this paper, the omplementarity index would be negatively
orrelated with FISIM and the market apital ineieny ratio (1) and these two hannels should
follow diretly or indiretly the same diretion.(2) The orrelation matrix showed in Table 2 gives
a rst intuition onerning the relation between the Complementarity Index and the two hannels:
Issuane and Bond are positively orrelated with the omplementarity index. This orrelation is
at 1% level signiant.
First of all, let us desribe the results of the random oeient estimation presented in
the Table 3. In the Model 1, we examine the link between the Complementarity Index as
explanatory variables of FISIM, exluding the hannels of transmission. The omplementarity
index is negatively orrelated with FISIM and signiant at 1%.
Adding the other hannel of transmission in the regression (see model 3 and 4) dereases
the level of statistial signiane at 5% but does not hange the negative sign of the index.
By doing it, we get less observations. Finally, the model 2, onsiders only the transmission
hannels without the omplementarity index in the set of explanatory variables. Surprisingly,
the three variables are not positively orrelated with FISIM. This result does not support the
Song and Thakor onerning the relevane of these transmission hannels. It does not support
the preliminary result presented in the Table 2.
13
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2012.39
Seondly, few words must be said about the Table 4. In this table, we want to study the
eieny in the stok markets. We ompute it by using the variable fees and ommission divided
by the value of stok market traded. In line with the Table 3, we nd that the omplementarity
index is negatively orrelated with our measure of Market Capital Ineieny. This results is
respetively signiant for the models 3 and 4, at 10% and 5%. Conerning the hannels of
transmission, none of their oeients are found signiant.
To summarize, there is a substantial evidene that the omplementarity index, and further-
more the omplementer systems, are negatively orrelated with FISIM and Market Capital Ef-
ieny. The seond main interpretation stressed by these empirial models onerns the trans-
mission anals between banks and nanial systems represented by issuane, own apital and
bonds. None of them are found statistially signiant.
This last point brings us to the seond part of the disussion: the analysis of the Generalized
Linear Models results. Returning to the results onerning the Random Coeient Models, the
hannels of transmission are found partially negatively orrelated with our denition of FISIM
but are not signiant.
Turning to the Gamma GEE, Table 5 reports the marginal eets of the independent variable
evaluated at the mean of FISIM. We nd that the three transmission hannels are statistially
signiant and negatively orrelated with the FISIM. The explanatory variable Bond are sta-
tistially signiant at 1% level for the three models. Issuane is statistially signiant and
negatively orrelated with our dependant variable in the Model 7. This model onsiders the link
of the hannel of transmission wit FISIM without onsidering the omplementarity index like the
Model 8. The Model 9 adds the square of the hannels of transmission in the regression. Sur-
prinsigly, in this model Own Capital are found positively orrelated with FISIM and statisally
signiant, but not the square of this variable. This variable exhibits a negative sign in the two
other models. This result does not state in the Table 6 whih report the marginal eets of the
independent variable measured as the mean of the Market Capital Eieny Ratio. All of the
transmission anal oeients exhibit a negative sign. Speially, the oeients representing
the Own Capital variable is signiant at, respetively for the models 8 and 9, 5% and 10%.
The onlusions stated above onerning the omplementarity index  and omplementary
systems  remains the same.
To put in a nutshell, the omplementarity theory stating that the omplementer systems are
14
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mode eient, works. Furthermore, the Complementarity Index ould be onsider as relevant to
represent this theory beause the hannels of transmission desribed by Song and Thakor exhibit
(mostly) the same sign to explain the FISIM and Market Capital Ineieny.
6 Conlusion
This paper addresses the question whether nanial systems with a high degree of omplementary
are more eient ompared to nanial systems in whih the banking setor and the stok market
are less intertwined. Eient nanial arhiteture failitates the transfer of apital between
savers and investors. To study the potential orrelation between the degree of omplementarity
and the eieny of the nanial system empirially, we propose an index of omplementarity
that as two explanatory variables of FISIM and Market Capital Ineieny as proxies for the
degree of ineieny.
More generally, the goal is to test the omplementarity theory empirially. That's the reason
why we use other variables onsidered theoretially by Song and Thakor: Issuane, Own Capital
and Bond. If we use the random oeient models, these hannels are not relevant to explain
the omplementer systems.
However, using Generalized Linear Models does not bring to the same onlusion. Two of
the hannels have an explanatory power to explain FISIM and Market Capital Ineieny. This
result is in aordane to the onlusion of Song and Thakor. The authors states that these
hannels are useful to prevent the fritions impeding borrowers to get naning. An important
other result is that the omplementarity index that we omputed in line with the Song and
Thakor theory works. The omplementer systems are more eient and the hannels identied
have an explanatory power to support eieny.
Finally, a few words must be said about the impliations of this paper. Instead of onsidering
two sorts of system: bank- and market-based, the regulators ould integrate the existing inter
onnexion between banks and markets and the determinants of it in their deisions. It remains
to be seen whether other anal of transmission ould be found to link bank and market systems?
We leave it for further researh.
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Figure 3: Dependent Variable FISIM. GEE Gamma Residuals
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Table 1: Summary statistis
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Obs.
FISIM 0.034 0.013 294
Market Capital Eieny 0.371 0.756 211
Complementarity 0.403 0.1 307
Finanial Development 8.359 15.607 268
Coevolution 0.317 2.077 304
Issuane 2.589 3.505 158
Own apital 11.954 3.546 179
Bond 237.763 260.179 295
Growth Rate 0.024 0.025 454
Interest Rate(short term) 0.06 0.039 482
Interest Rate(long term) 0.069 0.034 488
Interest Rate Spread 0.008 0.016 482
Ination rate 0.032 0.03 494
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Table 2: Correlation Matrix
FISIM 1
Market Capital Eieny 0.18** 1
Complementarity -0.16** -0.054 1
Finanial Development -0.037 0.67*** 0.12* 1
Coevolution -0.40*** -0.22** 0.39*** -0.06 1
Issuane 0.06 -0.26** 0.16 -0.21* 0.41*** 1
Own apital 0.42*** -0.06 -0.01 -0.06 -0.11 0.01 1
Bond -0.26*** -0.45*** 0.16** -0.42*** 0.28*** 0.65*** -0.15* 1
Growth Rate 0.09 0.05 0.15* -0.04 -0.06 -0.09 -0.03 -0.148* 1
Interest Rate(short term) 0.51*** 0.19** -0.41*** 0.02 -0.33*** 0.14 -0.15* -0.22*** 0.10* 1
Interest Rate(long term) 0.63*** 0.20** -0.49*** -0.05 -0.42*** -0.11 -0.03 -0.31*** 0.13** 0.92*** 1
Interest Rate Spread -0.01 -0.04 0.08 -0.11 -0.12* -0.37*** 0.2** -0.06 -0.01 -0.65*** -0.30*** 1
Ination rate 0.31*** -0.13 -0.38*** -0.12 -0.2*** 0.2* 0.05 -0.03 0.0940* 0.750*** 0.777*** -0.357*** 1
1
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Table 3: Random Coeient Regression on FISIM
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Compl. Index -0.00744*** -0.00336** -0.00234*
(4.91e-05) (0.0232) (0.0521)
Issuane 0.0269 0.00423 -0.00433
(0.732) (0.873) (0.291)
Iss. sq 0.00492
(0.384)
Own Capital 0.00117 0.00114* -0.00276
(0.105) (0.0561) (0.838)
Own Cap. sq 0.000158
(0.802)
Bond 3.42e-05 -7.77e-06 8.29e-05
(0.831) (0.922) (0.481)
Bond sq -1.27e-07
(0.397)
Constant 0.0325*** 0.0241*** 0.0238*** 0.0446
(0) (0.00376) (0.00438) (0.604)
Observations 267 117 104 77
Number of ountries 17 12 12 8
Skewness 1.32 -1.87 -1.56 -2.72
pval in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Aknowledgment:Ursula Glauninger provided exellent researh assistane. Our appreia-
tion also goes to Bruno Amable,Jean-Charles Briongne, Serguei Kaniovski and partiipants at
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Table 4: Random Coeient Regression on Market Capital Ineieny
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Compl. Index -0.230 -0.0708* -0.00995**
(0.284) (0.0563) (0.0156)
Issuane 0.735 -1.477 0.00115
(0.704) (0.323) (0.610)
Iss. sq 0.00118
(0.659)
Own Capital 0.0179 0.0222 -0.00345
(0.486) (0.420) (0.918)
Own Cap. sq 0.000309
(0.872)
Bond 0.00246 0.00160 -6.77e-05
(0.755) (0.515) (0.530)
Bond sq 6.59e-08
(0.644)
Constant 0.209 0.133 0.0878 0.0103
(0.176) (0.462) (0.558) (0.956)
Observations 211 85 85 58
Number of ountries 14 10 10 6
Skewness 2.20 -1.25 1.63 -1.40
pval in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5: Gamma GEE Regression on FISIM
(6) (7) (8) (9)
Comp. Index -0.00564*** -0.00250*** -0.00268***
(0) (0) (1.02e-09)
Issuane -0.000358** 0.000127 0.000762
(0.0323) (0.227) (0.105)
Iss. sq -5.65e-05
(0.122)
Own Capital -0.000402** -0.000690*** 0.00525***
(0.0156) (1.83e-08) (3.21e-08)
Own Cap. sq -0.000212***
(4.25e-09)
Bond -1.77e-05*** -1.67e-05*** -1.92e-05***
(1.08e-10) (0) (0.00146)
Bond sq 6.59e-09
(0.239)
Observations 267 129 116 116
Number of ountries 17 16 16 16
pval in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 6: Gamma GEE Regression on Market Capital Ineieny
(6) (7) (8) (9)
Comp. Index -0.0867** -0.00170** -0.00249**
(0.0143) (0.0478) (0.0217)
Issuane -0.00525 -0.00402** -0.00292
(0.121) (0.0283) (0.233)
Iss. sq -0.000276
(0.449)
Own Capital -0.000165 -0.00135** -0.00307*
(0.673) (0.0444) (0.0995)
Own Cap. sq 9.69e-05
(0.123)
Bond -7.56e-05** -5.35e-05** -3.46e-05*
(0.0371) (0.0186) (0.0919)
Bond sq -6.71e-10
(0.984)
Observations 211 93 93 93
Number of ountries 14 13 13 13
pval in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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A Desription and soure of variables
Seuritization Issuane of ountry of ollateral in million of national urreny divided by loan.
Soure: Assoiation for Finanial Market website, Bank of Australia, Bank of Canada.
Own apital Banks liabilities(Capital and reserves) divided by loans. Soure: OECD Banking
Statistis, Inome Statement Balane sheet
Complementarity Index varying over time. See Saillard and Url, 2011.
Interest expenses Interest expenses by banks (all banks) on deposits. Soure: OECD Banking
Statistis, Inome Statement and Balane sheet
Interest inome Interest inome by banks (all banks) on loans. Soure: OECD Banking Statis-
tis, Inome Statement and and balane sheet
Bonds International debt seurities Soure: OECD, OECD Banking Statistis, Inome State-
ment and Balane Sheet, Table 12B.
FISIM Own omputation as follow:(interest inome-interest expenses)/loan *100
Market Capital Ineieny Own omputation as follow: Fees and ommissions reeivable
divided by stok market value traded
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